India's Air Force Dilemma: Can Unmanned Combat Aircraft Bridge the Capability Gap?

The Indian Air Force is facing a pressing challenge: a shortage of combat squadrons that's unlikely to be solved through fighter procurement alone. The IAF's fighter fleet is currently transitioning between generations, with older aircraft such as the MiG-21 already retired and other legacy platforms gradually approaching the end of their useful service lives. The Tejas Mk1A programme is still ramping up, the Tejas Mk2 remains under development, and the AMCA is years away from becoming available in meaningful numbers. This creates a capability gap that needs to be addressed through additional means.

One potential solution is a much more aggressive push toward mass induction of unmanned combat aircraft, particularly platforms such as HAL's CATS Warrior and the DRDO Ghatak programme. These UCAVs can conduct surveillance, electronic warfare, and strike missions, and operate alongside manned fighters. The major advantage is that they can be produced and deployed in large numbers without the enormous human-resource burden associated with manned combat aviation. Every additional fighter squadron requires pilots, instructors, ground crews, and extensive training pipelines. An unmanned combat fleet would still require highly trained operators, maintenance personnel, and mission planners, but the manpower model could be fundamentally different.

The concept of a manned-unmanned force structure is the most sensible approach, with fighters as the core combat platform and UCAVs extending their reach. To make this work, India needs to accelerate autonomous mission management, secure datalinks, artificial intelligence, and sensor fusion. The central argument is not fighters versus UCAVs, but fighters plus UCAVs. Mass deployment of systems like CATS Warrior and Ghatak could provide a practical way to increase combat mass much sooner.

In a two-front scenario, UCAVs could provide additional persistence and weapons capacity without requiring India to maintain an equivalent number of pilots. A formation consisting of a manned fighter accompanied by several unmanned combat aircraft could potentially generate more sensors, electronic warfare capacity, and weapons than the fighter could carry independently. The concept also changes the economics of attrition. In a major conflict, expensive frontline fighters may become increasingly difficult to replace. If a lower-cost unmanned platform can perform selected strike, reconnaissance, or suppression missions, commanders could potentially accept a higher level of UCAV attrition while preserving scarce manned aircraft.

However, this does not mean India should abandon fighter acquisition. Quite the opposite is true. Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk2, Rafale, Su-30MKI upgrades, and AMCA remain essential components of the future IAF. UCAVs cannot fully replicate the flexibility, situational awareness, and decision-making capability of a human pilot, particularly in complex air-to-air engagements. The most sensible approach would therefore be a manned-unmanned force structure. Fighters would remain the core combat platform, while UCAVs would extend their reach and increase the number of combat assets available to commanders.

For this concept to work, however, India would need to accelerate autonomous mission management, secure datalinks, artificial intelligence, sensor fusion, electronic warfare, and human-machine teaming. UCAVs cannot simply be remotely controlled aircraft if they are expected to operate in heavily contested environments where communications may be degraded or denied. This is where programmes such as CATS Warrior and Ghatak become strategically important. They provide India with an opportunity to develop the technologies required for a future air force in which a single pilot could potentially control or coordinate multiple unmanned platforms.

The IAF's fighter shortage is unlikely to disappear quickly. Waiting for the fleet to reach the desired squadron strength before addressing the capability gap would leave India exposed during the transition period. A larger UCAV force could provide an additional layer of combat power while the manned fighter fleet gradually expands. The central argument is therefore not fighters versus UCAVs. It is fighters plus UCAVs. Fighters will remain the backbone of India's combat aviation for decades. But if India accepts that reaching the required number of manned fighter squadrons will take time, then mass deployment of systems such as CATS Warrior and eventually Ghatak could provide a practical way to increase combat mass much sooner.