Countering the Swarm: India's Air Defence Conundrum

India's air-defence systems have been put to the test in Operation Sindoor, and the results are renewing debate over the need for a dedicated, low-cost counter-drone layer. The reported addition of two drones to the list of aerial targets attributed to India's Akash air-defence system highlights a broader question about the role of different layers within India's air-defence architecture.

Conventional air-defence missiles are not necessarily the most economical solution for dealing with small, relatively inexpensive drones. The emergence of increasingly large numbers of low-cost unmanned threats has created a difficult cost-exchange problem for air-defence forces: using a sophisticated missile to destroy a comparatively inexpensive drone can rapidly consume expensive interceptors.

The Indian Army is developing systems specifically designed around the economics and characteristics of the drone threat. One of the most prominent examples is Bhargavastra, a low-cost hard-kill counter-drone system developed by Solar Defence and Aerospace Limited. Bhargavastra has been designed around a layered approach, with its first layer using unguided micro-rockets to neutralise drone swarms within a defined lethal radius, and a second layer using guided micro-missiles for more precise engagements.

The system's developers have demonstrated the micro-rockets in trials at the Seaward Firing Range in Gopalpur, where four rockets were fired, including a two-rocket salvo launched within two seconds. The system has also been designed with the possibility of incorporating soft-kill capabilities like jamming and spoofing.

Bhargavastra is intended for deployment in difficult terrain, including high-altitude areas above 5,000 metres. Its sensor architecture combines radar with electro-optical and infrared systems, while the system can be configured according to the user's required sensor and launcher arrangement.

The experience of Operation Sindoor highlights the need for a layered air-defence architecture, where different threats are assigned to different weapons. A dedicated system like Bhargavastra could provide an additional close-in hard-kill layer against drone threats, improving the cost-effectiveness of engagements. The question now is, can India accelerate the development and deployment of such systems to keep pace with the growing drone threat?

The answer lies in the country's ability to develop and integrate multiple layers of air-defence systems, each with different cost and performance characteristics. This would allow commanders to assign different threats to different weapons, preserving expensive air-defence missiles for targets that genuinely justify their use.

The phrase that India cannot keep using a 'hammer to kill mosquitoes' captures the underlying economic problem, although the analogy should not be taken literally. The appropriate weapon depends on the target, threat level, engagement geometry, and probability of successful interception.

The experience of Operation Sindoor has made this issue more immediate. Drone warfare is increasingly characterised not only by individual UAVs but also by combinations of reconnaissance drones, one-way attack systems, and larger numbers of inexpensive platforms intended to saturate defensive networks.

A dedicated system such as Bhargavastra could potentially provide an additional close-in hard-kill layer against these threats, particularly when integrated with existing radar, electro-optical, and command-and-control networks. Its ability to combine relatively inexpensive micro-rockets with guided interceptors is intended to improve the cost-effectiveness of engagements against different classes of small aerial targets.

However, successful trials do not automatically translate into immediate large-scale induction. The Army would still need to complete user evaluation, establish production capacity, determine deployment requirements, and integrate the system into its wider air-defence network.

The reported Akash engagements therefore should not be interpreted as evidence that Akash is unsuitable for drone defence. Rather, they highlight why modern air defence needs multiple layers with different cost and performance characteristics.

For India, the lesson may be that systems such as Bhargavastra need to move through testing, procurement, and deployment as quickly as practical. The country is likely to face increasingly sophisticated and numerous drone threats, and maintaining a sustainable interceptor cost ratio will become as important as achieving a high probability of kill.

As India continues to develop and deploy its air-defence systems, it is essential to consider the role of different layers within the air-defence architecture. A dedicated system like Bhargavastra could provide an additional close-in hard-kill layer against drone threats, improving the cost-effectiveness of engagements. By developing and integrating multiple layers of air-defence systems, India can maintain a sustainable interceptor cost ratio and keep pace with the growing drone threat.

Key Takeaways

• India's air-defence systems have been put to the test in Operation Sindoor, with the reported addition of two drones to the list of aerial targets attributed to India's Akash air-defence system.
• The emergence of inexpensive drones has created a cost-exchange problem for air-defence forces, where using a sophisticated missile to destroy a drone can rapidly consume expensive interceptors.
• Bhargavastra, a low-cost hard-kill counter-drone system, has been developed to address this problem, with its layered approach using unguided micro-rockets and guided micro-missiles to engage targets.
• The system has been demonstrated in trials at the Seaward Firing Range in Gopalpur, where four micro-rockets were fired, including a two-rocket salvo launched within two seconds.
• A dedicated system like Bhargavastra could provide an additional close-in hard-kill layer against drone threats, improving the cost-effectiveness of engagements.