China's Critique of India's Nuclear Submarine Programme: A Reality Check

China's Critique of India's Nuclear Submarine Programme: A Reality Check

In recent months, Chinese state-run media has been scrutinizing India's Arihant-class submarine design, raising concerns about its acoustic stealth and engineering standards. The NetEase article, published in September 2026, ranked India's Arihant class sixth and last among ballistic missile submarines, citing reliance on foreign technology and equipment.

The article's central argument is that India's nuclear submarine programme is driven by political objectives rather than technological prowess. Critics argue that India's heavy-industrial capabilities are insufficient to manufacture pressure hull sections with diameters approaching 12 meters. According to the article, India has tried to compensate for these limitations by increasing the submarine's length.

However, not all Chinese commentary on India's nuclear submarine capability has been uniformly dismissive. A 12 September wforum analysis of the Federation of American Scientists' Indian Nuclear Weapons 2026 report examined developments in India's nuclear forces, including the Agni-5 Mk2 and the reportedly MIRV capability. The analysis discussed the INS Aridhaman, describing an eight-launch-tube configuration associated with the K-4 and K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

A different perspective came from Hong Kong publication HK01 on 19 September. While acknowledging that India's indigenous nuclear submarine technology is at a relatively early stage, the publication argued that the programme should not be ridiculed. Its reasoning is that China itself underwent a similar process while developing its own nuclear submarine capabilities.

The contrast between these assessments is telling: some Chinese commentators have focused on alleged weaknesses in India's present submarine designs and have predicted difficulties for the S5 programme, while others have been more aware that developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent involves a progression of engineering and operational capabilities.

The claims about Arihant's acoustic signature and India's pressure-hull manufacturing limitations remain unverified in the supplied material. However, the Chinese critique of India's nuclear submarine programme serves as a reality check, highlighting the challenges and limitations of developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent.

In conclusion, the Chinese critique of India's nuclear submarine programme is a complex issue that requires a nuanced understanding of the technical and strategic challenges involved. While some Chinese commentators have raised concerns about India's present submarine designs, others have acknowledged the progress made by India's nuclear submarine programme.

As India continues to develop its nuclear submarine capabilities, it is essential to address the technical and engineering challenges highlighted by the Chinese critique. By doing so, India can ensure that its nuclear submarine programme is driven by technological prowess rather than political objectives.